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I. HISTORY
A. The NationalAcademy of Sciences and The NationalAcademy
ofMedicine
In the early 1850s, a group of scientists enlisted the help of Senator
Henry Wilson and drafted a bill for the incorporation of the National
Academy of Sciences.' The bill was passed by the Senate and the House
of Representatives on March 3, 1863, and was signed into law by
President Lincoln.2 Under the authority of its charter, in 1970, the
National Academy of Sciences established the Institute of Medicine,
which was later re-named the National Academy of Medicine. 3 The
National Academy of Medicine serves as an advisor to the nation and the
*
1.
Mar. 25,
2.
3.

J.D., University of Florida-Levin College of Law 2018.
History, NAT'L ACAD. OF Sd., http://www.nasonline.org/about-nas/history/ (last visited
2018).
Id.
Id.
265
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international community to encourage positive action across sectors and
address critical issues in health, medicine, and related policy.4
B. The Institute ofMedicine: To Err is Human
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM"), now the National
Academy of Medicine ("NAM"), along with other contributors released
To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, which identified many
issues with patient safety and the quality of care in the United States.5 At
the time of publication, two large studies revealed significant occurrences
of adverse incidents resulting in death.6 When the data was extrapolated
to the 33.6 million admissions to U.S. hospitals in 1997, the findings were
daunting.7 The results indicated between 44 000 and 98,000 Americans
died each year as a result of medical errors. At that time, deaths due to
medical errors exceeded the eighth leading cause of death, topping deaths
from motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or AIDS. 9
The report described the substantial losses from medical errors, both
measurable and immeasurable.' 0 At that time, medication errors alone
were estimated to annually account for 1,000 more deaths than the
number of Americans who died from workplace injuries." A study found
that "about two out of every 100 admissions experienced a preventable
adverse drug event, resulting in average increased hospital costs of
$4,700 per admission or about $2.8 million annually for a 700-bed
teaching hospital." 1 2 Despite these shocking numbers, the estimate was a
modest one due to the fact that only a small portion of the total at-risk
population consisted of hospital patients.1 3 Healthcare is provided in a
variety of different settings including ambulatory settings, outpatient
surgical centers, physician offices, clinics, and even home care.14
However, the effects do not stop there. For example, the healthcare
system experienced the negative effects of opportunity costs.15
Specifically, money spent on repeating diagnostic tests or counteracting
4. About the National Academy of Medicine, NAT'L ACAD. OF MED.,
https://nam.edu/about-the-nam/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
5. See Kenneth 1. Shine, Foreword to INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE: COMMITTEE ON QUALITY
OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM xi-xii
(Linda T. Kohn et al., eds., 2000).

6. Id. at 1.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.

9. Id.
10. See id. at 1-3.
11. Id. at 2.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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adverse drug events depletes the amount of money that can be spent on
other positive healthcare improvements. 16 To that end, when additional
services are needed due to improper care, purchasers and patients alike
suffer increased costs in insurance and copays.7
The report attributed additional losses beyond monetary costs due to
medical errors.1 Medical errors create an atmosphere of distrust by
patients in the system, and these errors also lead to a weakened level of
satisfaction among both patients and health professionals.' 9 For example,
patients who come face-to-face with medical errors tend to experience
longer hospital stays or even disability, which, in turn, cause physical or
psychological pain. 20 For healthcare professionals, medical errors create
an unsettling feeling, which results in frustration and a loss of morale.2 1
Society as a whole has come to bear some of these burdens because longer
hospital stays for patients or disability results in businesses' loss of
worker productivity, reduced school attendance by children, and overall
lower levels of population health status. 2 2
The question then becomes, why was there such an impediment to
creating a solution when the presence of medical errors were significant,
yet, healthcare professionals aim to help their patients? Historically
speaking, the healthcare system was very fragmented, which made it
harder for providers to work in a cohesive way to ensure optimal results
for patients.23 To make matters worse, healthcare providers "have
historically been reluctant to report errors that occur in the course of
healthcare service delivery, due to fear of liability, the risk of adverse
actions against them by hospital medical staffs, licensing boards, and
other professional organizations, and the potential for injury to their
to
professional reputations." 2 4 This reluctance stunted the abilit
systematically expose errors, learn from them, and create solutions.
The report detailed a proposed plan of action to address these errors
and overcome the cycle of inaction. 26 The report emphasized the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.

24. Charles M. Key, The Role of PSQIA Privilege in Medical ErrorReduction, 21 HEALTH

LAW. 24, 24 (2008) (citing Notice of proposed rulernaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 8,112, 8,113 (Feb. 12,
2008)) [hereinafter Key, Role of PSQIA]; Charles M. Key, Toward a Safer lealth System:
Medical Injury Compensation and Medical Quality, 37 MEM. L. REv. 459, 465-66 (2007)
[hereinafter Key, Toward a Safer Health System].
25. Key, Role of PSQIA, supra note 24, at 24. See also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note
5, at 3.
26. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 5, at 3-4.
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importance of analyzing errors, because the process helps providers
evaluate necessary changes, and recommended that:
All adverse events resulting in serious injury or death
should be evaluated to assess whether improvements in
the delivery system can be made to reduce the likelihood
of similar events occurring in the future. Errors that do not
result in harm also represent an important opportunity to
identify system improvements having the potential to
prevent adverse events. 2 7
They predicted that restructuring the system to focus on building
safety into processes of care and departing from placing blame on
individual healthcare providers would significantly minimize errors. 28 In
making this prediction, the report pointed out that blaming healthcare
providers for past errors does not improve the system, nor does it prevent
that healthcare provider, or any other healthcare provider, from
committing the same error in the future.2 9
"To err is human, but errors can be prevented." 3 0 To accomplish the
proposed plan, the report looked at the model used by the aviation
industry to build safer systems and recommended a four-tiered
approach. 3 1 This approach included "identifying and learning from errors
through immediate and strong mandatory reporting efforts, as well as the
encouragement of voluntary efforts, both with the aim of making sure the
system continues to be made safer for patients." 32 A key component of
the comprehensive strategy is to "creat[e] an environment that
encourages organizations to identify errors, evaluate causes and take
appropriate actions to improve performance in the future." 33 Voluntary
reporting systems have a broad scope, and ensuring protection of the
information with confidentiality gives providers security and confidence
to provide information that the system uses to support quality
improvement efforts of healthcare organizations. 3 4
The IOM's Quality of Health Care in America Committee was formed
in June of 1998 to develop a strategy for improvement, and specifically
recommended that "Congress should pass legislation to extend peer
review protections to data related to patient safety and quality
improvement that are collected and analyzed by health care organizations
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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for internal use or shared with others solely for purposes of improving
safety and quality." 35 In making this recommendation, the committee
recognized healthcare providers' apprehension in reporting errors that are
not required by existing external reporting obligations due to their legal
fears of discoverability, and recognized that "[a] more conducive
environment is needed to encourage health care professionals and
organizations to identify, analyze, and report errors without threat of
litigation and without compromising patients' legal rights." 36
II. PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2005
A. Legislative Action
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act ("PSQIA") amends
the Public Health Service Act to "enhance the data available to assess and
resolve patient safety and health care quality issues," as recommended by
the Institute of Medicine Quality of Health Care in America Committee
in To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.37 To eliminate the
apprehension previously felt by healthcare providers and to encourage
reporting and analysis of medical errors, the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") issued the Patient Safety Rule to implement
the PSQIA, and through it, established patient safety work product
("PSWP"), which "provides Federal privilege and confidentiality
protections for patient safety information." 3 8 The PSQIA gives the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality the responsibility of listing
patient safety organizations ("PSOs").
The PSQIA serves as a critical piece in the IOM's framework by
working to balance the following two goals:
1) To improve patient safety and reduce medical errors
by creating a 'culture of safety' to share and learn from
information related to patient safety events, and
2) to promote health care providers' accountability and
transparency through mechanisms such as oversight by
regulatory agencies and adjudication in the legal system.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id.
37. PatientSafety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 Statute and Rule, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/patient-safety/statute-

and-rule/index.html?language=es (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). See generally Guidance on Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,655, 32,655 (May 24, 2016) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3).
38. PatientSafety and Quality Improvement Act of2005 Statute and Rule, supra note 37.
39. Id. See also Patient Safety Rule, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY,
https://www.pso.ahrq.gov/legislation/rule (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).

40. 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,655.
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To achieve these goals, the Patient Safety Act establishes a system
that encourages healthcare providers to voluntarily gather and report
information related to patient safety, health care quality, and health care
outcomes to PSOs, which serve to analyze the collected data and provide
feedback and recommendations on ways to improve patient safety and
quality of care. 4 ' In an attempt to prevent future errors, the PSOs utilize
the information to evaluate errors and provide feedback to the healthcare
providers. 4 2 The new privileges and confidentiality associated with
PSWP reduced many healthcare providers' prior concerns and helped
create an environment for providers to learn from the information
provided to the PSOs.43
B. PatientSafety Work Product
PSWP is privileged and confidential, in part, because it typically
identifies the providers involved in a patient safety event or the individual
who reported the information." The Patient Safety Act explains that

PSWP:
means any data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses
(such as root cause analyses), or written or oral
statements--(i) which-(I) are assembled or developed by a provider for
reporting to a patient safety organization and are reported
to a patient safety organization; or
(II) are developed by a patient safety organization for
the conduct of patient safety activities; and which could
result in improved patient safety, health care quality, or
health care outcomes; or
(ii) which identify or constitute the deliberations or
analysis of, or identify the fact of reporting pursuant to, a
patient safety evaluation system.4 5
The reporting pathway is the most common way providers create their
PSWP. 4 6 The reporting pathway requires that any information reported to
a PSO must have the ability to "improve patient safety, health care
quality, or health care outcomes;" further, the information must be
"assembled or developed by a provider for reporting to a PSO," and
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. PatientSafety Organization(PSO) Program:FrequentlyAsked Questions,AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, https://pso.ahrq.gov/faq(last visited Mar. 21, 2018) [hereinafter

PSO FAQ].
45. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A) (2012).
46. 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,656.
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subsequently be reported to a PSO. 47 The benefit of the reporting pathway
is that any PSWP collected and stored in a provider's patient safety
evaluation system ("PSES") is considered privileged and confidential
before it is reported to a PS0. 4 8 This structure promotes external
transparency by creating an environment focused on addressing the issues
in a constructive and blame-free way. 4 9 This structure also allows
providers time to properly document medical incidents, and it also
alleviates the burden associated with immediately reporting the
information to a PSO for the protections to apply.5 0 However, the Patient
Safety Act makes clear that information should be placed in the PSES
only if it is intended to be reported to a PSO. 5 1 PSWP does not include
information required by other external reporting obligations such as
requirements by federal or state health agencies.5 2
C. PatientSafety Evaluation Systems
The Patient Safety Act defines PSES as the "collection, management,
or analysis of information for reporting to or by a patient safety
organization." 53 Information that is documented and collected within a
PSES by a provider becomes PSWP upon collection; however, this does
not mean that information required by external reporting requirements is
automatically considered confidential PSWP because it is collected and
maintained in the PSES. 54
Due to this requirement, providers expressed concern that maintaining
two separate systems with duplicate information would be a heavy time
and cost burden.5 5 In response, the Department modified the regulations
to "allow providers the flexibility to collect and review information
within a patient safety evaluation system to determine if the information
is needed to fulfill external reporting obligations," at which time, the
information can be removed from the system and be reported pursuant to
external reporting obligations. 5 6 The Final Rule states that "providers
need not maintain duplicate systems to separate information to be
reported to a PSO from information that may be required to fulfill state
reporting obligations."5 7 This means that all information collected in a
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. SUSAN KENDIG & REBECCA G. MILLER, PATIENT SAFETY ORGANIZATIONS
TRANSPARENCY: WORKING TOGETHER TO IMPROVE PATIENT SAFETY 3 (2012).

AND

50. 81 Fed. Reg. at 32,656.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(6) (2012).
81 Fed. Reg. at 32,659.

55. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732, 70,740 (Nov. 2008).
56. Id. at 70744.

57. Id. at 70742.
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PSES is PSWP and protected unless and until the provider determines
that certain information must be removed for external reporting
obligations, at which point the information can be removed and is no
longer PSWP. 5 8 This process recognizes that information taken out of the
PSES to meet external reporting requirements is not protected by PSWP;
however, the information that remains in the system remains protected
under the PSQIA.5 9
D. PatientSafety Organizations
The PSOs are listed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality when the entities show they have an expertise in identifying and
analyzing threats to the quality of patient safety, as well as the ability to
use that information to create interventions that reduce risks. 60 The
PSQIA outline the necessary criteria for a PSO to be listed by the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, specifically, the Act requires that
the primary activity of the PSO must be to conduct activities to improve
patient safety and quality of care. 6 1The Patient Safety Rule allows many
types of entities to seek listing as a PSO but requires that the entity certify
that it meets 15 individual statutory requirements. 62
PSOs are entities where providers voluntarily report their information
related to patient safety. 63 PSOs aggregate and analyze the data and make
recommendations to improve the quality of patient safety. 4 PSOs achieve
the best of both worlds, in that they create an environment for improving
patient safety, while also reducing the risk to providers by attaching
privilege and confidentiality protections so long as the information is not
required by external reporting obligations.6 5 By collecting and analyzing
this type of information, the PSOs can gain an understanding of the
factors that contribute to a near miss, which can be widely used to educate
providers to reduce the risk to patients. 6 6 As one PSO put it, "PSO
participation provides a platform to analyze both publicly and
confidentially reported data to determine the underlying causes of patient
safety events and inform meaningful action."67

58. Id.
59. Brief of Amici Curiae at 6, S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., v. Charles, 178 So. 3d 102
(Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (No. ID15-0109).
60. PSO FAQ, supra note 44.
6 1. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Guidance on Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,655,
32,655 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3).
65. KENDIG & MILLER, supra note 49, at 4.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 5.

2019]
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III. THE CHALLENGE TO PSWP

A. State Issues with PSWP
Not surprisingly, the Patient Safety Act has been, and still is, litigated
across the country, often in the medical malpractice context. 68 In addition,
states have differed on their interpretation of the Patient Safety Act as it
relates to state law. 6 9 The state of Florida, in particular, has come to a
recent resting place that ultimately frustrates the purpose of the PSQIA.
This frustration stems from the passage of a Florida Constitutional
amendment regarding adverse medical incidents.
B. Amendment 7: A Patient'sRight to Know About Adverse
Medical Incidents
For decades, the law in Florida provided several privileges to ensure
honest and open peer review to increase the quality of care.7 0 Both the
Florida legislature and the Florida courts preserved the peer review
processes performed by hospitals and healthcare providers by
immunizing those who participated in peer review and by enactin
statutes that mandated the confidentiality of those processes.
Amendment 7 reversed decades of public policy developments that
encouraged physicians to communicate openly and honestly in the peer
review process, a process that strengthened patient safety and the quality
of care.
Florida's Amendment 7 resulted from a battle of the ballots between
the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers ("AFTL") and Florida's
Physicians.7 3 The conflict arose when Florida's Physicians sought to
restrict attorney's fees in medical malpractice cases, which resulted in a
response by the AFTL; specifically, the AFTL proposed an amendment
that was misrepresented to citizens as a measure to increase consumer
information.7 4 Although on its face Amendment 7 seemed to provide
consumers with additional information about healthcare providers,

68. See Charles v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017); Tibbs v.
Bunnell, 448 S.W.3d 796 (Ky. 2014).
69. Charles, 209 So. 3d at 1203.
70. Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219-20 (Fla. 1984). See also Cruger v. Love, 599 So.
2d 111, 113-14 (Fla. 1992).
71. Laura V. Yaeger, Amendment 7: Medical Tradition v. The Will of the People: Has
Florida'sPeer Review Privilege Vanished?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 123, 123 (2009).
72. Id. at 123-24.
73. Philip M. Cox et al., The Amendment 7 Decade: Ten Years of Living with a "Patient's
Right to Know" in Florida, 25 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 282 (2014).
74. Id.
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functionally, and in reality, it served almost exclusively as a litigation
tool.7 5
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, physicians began to suffer
significantly.7 6 The American Medical Association cited Florida as a
crisis state for three consecutive years due to the effects that medical
malpractice jury awards and medical liability insurance premiums had on
the practice of medicine.7 7 To add to the suffering, a report from the
Insurance Information Institute revealed that "Florida doctors were sued
twice as often as their peers in other states."7 8 In an attempt to alleviate
the suffering, the Florida Medical Association ("FMA") sought to place
restrictions on attorney contingency fees in medical malpractice
actions. 7 9 This incited anger in the AFTL, and in retaliation, the AFTL
planned four initiatives, which included Amendment 7.so The AFTL
openly admitted that the proposed amendments were brought about to
threaten and intimidate the FMA, forcing the withdrawal of the
restrictions the FMA sought to impose on attorneys' contingency fees.8 1
Amendment 7 was particularly misleading to the Florida voters, as it was
disguised as a consumer information amendment that "would grant any
patient the right to review any records relating to adverse medical
incidents." 8 2
The ballot, titled "Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Medical
Incidents," included the following summary:
Current Florida law restricts information available to
patients related to investigations of adverse medical
incidents, such as medical malpractice. This amendment
would give patients the right to review, upon request,
records of health care facilities' or providers' adverse
medical incidents, including those which could cause
injury or death. Provides that patients' identities should
not be disclosed.8 3
The ballot summary language led Florida citizens to believe that they
were being offered a right to know about information that had previously
been withheld, without providing any explanation regarding why the
75. Yaeger, supra note 71, at 129.
76. Cox et al., supra note 73, at 287.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 293-94.
Id. at 294.
Yaeger, supra note 71, at 127.

83. Patients' Right to Know About Adverse Medical Incidents Ballot 03-07, FLA.
DIVISION OF ELECTIONS, http://dos.elections.myflorida.com/initiatives/initdetail.asp?account-35

169&seqnum=3 (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
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"Florida Legislature had 'restricted' disclosure of information related to

adverse medical incidents for the thirty years prior to [the] initiative." 84
Florida statutorily mandates that hospitals maintain an internal risk
management program, that requires the retention of a licensed risk
manager to run the facility's risk management program. 8 In July 2013, a
study was conducted that surveyed licensed Florida risk managers of the
218 acute care hospitals in Florida, and the findings exposed the lack of
meaningful benefits from Amendment 7.86 The study revealed that "[a]n
overwhelming 98.04% (+/-2.2%) of respondents reported that all (100%)
of their Amendment 7 requests stemmed from or resulted in litigation." 8
Further, "[1]ess than one percent (0.98% (+/-1.6%)) of Amendment 7
requests received by respondents [were] reported to have come from
prospective patients interest in selecting prospective health care
services." 88 Additionally, "an equally low number (0.98% (+/-1.6%)) of
requests came from patients interested in health care services they were
currently receiving."9 In other words, the study revealed that the main
use of Amendment 7 was not to provide citizens with information related
to patient safety, but instead, was to force favorable settlements by
litigation attorneys, who had access to otherwise undiscoverable and
confidential information. 9 0
C. Charlesv. Southern Baptist Hospital, Inc. (CharlesI): The First
DistrictCourt ofAppeal
The use of Amendment 7 as a litigation tool caused numerous disputes
in the courts. Recently, the PSQIA and Amendment 7 came head to head
when the First District Court of Appeal took on a case concerning the
intersection of Amendment 7 and the PSQIA. 9 1 Southern Baptist Hospital
participated in information sharing under the PSQIA and maintained a
PSES set up to collect, manage, and analyze the information needed for
reporting to its PSO. 9 2 The employees of Baptist entered information into
the PSES relying on the confidentiality of the protections in the PSQIA.9 3
Baptist collected and maintained what they referred to as "occurrence
reports," "regardless of whether an event might constitute 'an adverse

84. Cox et al., supra note 73, at 296.

85. FLA. STAT.

§ 395.0197(1)-(2) (2018). See also Cox et al., supra note 73, at 301.

86. Cox et al., supra note 73, at 301.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 283.
S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla, Inc. v. Charles, 178 So. 3d 102, 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)

[hereinafter Charles 1].

92. Id. at 106.
93. Id.
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medical incident' under Amendment 7.94 The "occurrence reports"
detailed events "not consistent with the routine operations of the hospital
or the routine care of a patient or that could result in an injury." 95
The ultimate dispute in the case arose out of a medical malpractice
action initiated by respondents Jean Charles, Jr., as next friend and duly
appointed guardian of his sister, Marie Charles and her minor children,
who claimed that Baptist's negligence caused Marie Charles to suffer a
"catastrophic neurological injury." 96 Pursuant to Amendment 7, the
respondents "requested documents that: (1) related to adverse medical
incidents and (2) either related to any physician who worked for Baptist
or arose from care and treatment rendered by Baptist during the threeyear period preceding Marie-Charles' care and treatment." 97 Under
Florida Statute § 395.0197(6) and (7), the law requires hospitals to create
and maintain adverse incident reports in the form of Annual Reports and
Code 15 Reports. 98 Baptist provided responsive documentation,
which included Code 15 reports ... and two occurrence
reports specific to Marie Charles that had been extracted
from Baptist's [PSES] before they were reported [to] the
PSO. Baptist claimed that certain other documents,
primarily occurrence reports, while potentially responsive,
were not subject to production because they were privileged
and confidential under the Act.99
The respondents moved to compel the production of the additional
documents and argued that the PSQIA "only protects documents created
solely for the purpose of submission to a PSO," and, if the information is
collected or maintained for another purpose or a dual purpose, then it does
not constitute PSWP.'" Further, the respondents argued that the
information does not constitute PSWP if it relates "to a healthcare
provider's obligation to comply with federal, state, or local laws or
accrediting or licensing requirements."' 0 ' The circuit court found that if
the information was "collected or maintained for a purpose other than
submission to a PSO or for 'dual purposes,"' then the information is not
PSWP, even if the information was collected in a PSES for "submission
to a PSO and did not exist outside of a PSES."l 02
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(6), (7) (2018).
Charles 1, 178 So. 3d at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 107
Id.
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On appeal to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, Baptist
argued that the circuit court's order contradicted the plain language of the
PSQIA and undermined the purpose behind the Act that Congress
intended to advance. 10 3 The district court first looked to the plain
language of the PSQIA, specifically, to the definition of PSWP. 0 The
district court ruled that the documents were entitled to federal protection
under the PSQIA, reasoning that the documents at issue clearly met the
PSWP definition and that the documents were placed into Baptist's PSES
05
Further, the
"where they remained pending submission to a PSO."s
court noted that the documents did not fall into the definition of what is
not PSWP under the Act because the documents were "not original
patient records and were not collected, maintained, or developed
separately from the [PSES]."10 6
The district court discussed the circuit court's and petitioner's heavy
focus on the exceptions to the definition of PSWP, specifically addressing
the argument that "because some of the documents at issue may serve a
'dual purpose, "'-which may also be required under state law-PSWP
status is removed. 1 0 7 The respondent's argument focused heavily on the
"occurrence reports," claiming that the documents were the same as the
incident reports required by Florida Statute § 395.0197.08 The
respondents also argued that even if the "occurrence reports" did not have
to be produced to the State, the Florida statutes and the Florida
Administrative Code require that the Agency for Healthcare
Administration have access to the documents, which, they argued,
"effectively [meant] the documents are 'reported' under state law." 9
103. Id.
104. Id. at 107-08. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 299b-21(7)(A) (2012) (defining PSWP as "any data,

reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause analyses), or written or oral statements

which are assembled or developed by a provider for reporting to a patient safety organization and
are reported to a patient safety organization; or are developed by a patient safety organization for
the conduct of patient safety activities; and which could result in improved patient safety, health
care quality, or health care outcomes; or which identify or constitute the deliberations or analysis
of, or identify the fact of reporting pursuant to, a patient safety evaluation system"); id § 299b21(7)(B)(i)-(ii) (defining what type of information is not protected PSWP including "a patient's
medical record, billing and discharge information, or any other original patient or provider
record," and "information that is collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists
separately, from a patient safety evaluation system ... reported to a patient safety organization
shall not by reason of its reporting be considered patient safety work product"); id. § 299b21(7)(B)(iii) (stating that "the definition of PSWP should not be construed to relieve a provider's
duty to respond to federal, state, or local law obligations with information that is not privileged
or confidential . . .").
105. Charles I, 178 So. 3d at 108.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 109.
108. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 395.0197 (2018).
109. Charles 1, 178 So. 3d at 109.
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By rejecting the circuit court's interpretation, the district court
explained that the argument reads additional terms into the definition of
PSWP because the PSQIA does not state that a document cannot be
PSWP if it also meets a state reporting requirement.1 10 In fact, the district
court pointed out that "HHS's rule guidance specifically addresses this
scenario by assuring providers that they may place information into their
[PSES] with the expectation of protection and may later remove the
information if the provider determines that it must be reported to the
State.""' The district court went on to say that the circuit court's
interpretation gave "the false impression that federal protection under the
[PSQIA] and state compliance have to be mutually exclusive." 1 2 The
district court noted that the "dual purpose" language also gave a false
impression that protection under the PSQIA and state compliance have to
be mutually exclusive.113
The district court interpreted the PSQIA in a way that gives providers
flexibility to collect and maintain information in the way they choose;
however, in doing so, the court cautioned that nothing should be
construed to limit the reporting requirements under state or federal law.114
In so cautioning, the court indicated that the decision on how to store
information is up to the provider, as it is the provider who must deal with
the consequences of noncompliance with state or federal reporting
requirements. 5 The district court also addressed the concern that this
structure could result in a Frovider placing all of its information into a
PSES to avoid discovery." In addressing this concern, the district court
pointed out that this scenario is unlikely to occur because the PSQIA
specifically defines what is and is not PSWP; however, even if it were to
occur, the actual issue to be corrected is the provider's failure to comply
with state or federal reporting requirements, which could be remedied in
the same way as before the passage of the PSQIA." 7 Of import, it was
not alleged that Baptist failed to comply with any reporting or
recordkeeping obligations, and, further, Baptist did produce Code 15
Reports and Annual Reports required by the State under Florida law. 1 8
Consequently, the district court explained that absent an allegation that
the provider failed to comply with state reporting requirements, the court

110.
111.
2008).
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. See also Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732,70,742 (Nov.
Charles 1, 178 So. 3d at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 109-10.
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"should not be involved in the provider's participation" under the
PSQIA.l 9
The district court also addressed federal preemption, pointing to the
language in the PSQIA stating "' [n]otwithstanding any other provision of
Federal, State, or local law. . . [PSWP] shall be privileged,' and goes on
to state that PSWP is not subject to disclosure in various ways including
discovery in connection with a Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding, among other ways." 12 0 The district court also
noted that the PSQIA mandates a penalty for improper disclosure of
PSWP, and concluded that "the [PSQIA] expressly preempts any broad
discovery right under Amendment 7 to documents meeting the definition
of PSWP."' In addition to express preemption, the court explained that
"Amendment 7 is also impliedly preempted by the [PSQIA] because
compliance with both federal and state law would be impossible."' 2 2
Specifically, the district court explained that documents that meet the
definition of PSWP under the PSQIA are confidential, and "[Lt]o produce
PSWP in response to an Amendment 7 discovery request would be in
contravention to the [PSQIA]."I2 3
In Charles I, the district court interpreted the plain language of the
PSQIA in accordance with the original purpose behind the PSQIA's
enactment. For improvement in the quality of care to occur, healthcare
providers need to feel protected in their patient safety initiatives,
specifically, the information providers choose to collect and maintain in
their PSES that is subsequently sent to their PSO for analysis.1 2 4 Under
the Florida statute, the law requires hospitals to create and maintain
adverse incident reports in the form of Annual Reports and Code 15
Reports.1 2 5 These reports are factual, and do not include PSWP; however,
these facts may spawn PSWP through the PSES. Baptist provided the
documents it was required to report under state law but did not provide
other information collected and maintained in their PSES for reporting to
the PSO.1 2 6 Although Florida citizens have the right to access information
about adverse medical incidents, the information healthcare providers are
required to report to the state does not include the information sought in
this case, which is used for purposes of the PSO. Allowing providers to
maintain PSWP in their PSES with the protections afforded under the
PSQIA is consistent with the purpose behind its enactment.
119. Id.atll0.
120. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 299b-22 (2012)).

121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id.
124. See id. at 105.
125. See FLA. STAT.

§ 395.0197(6)(a) (2018).

126. See Charles1, 178 So. 3d at 106.
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D. Charles v. Southern Baptist Hospital ofFlorida, Inc. (CharlesII):
The FloridaSupreme Court
The Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the First District Court of
Appeal on both statutory interpretation of the PSQIA as well as
preemption and held "that the Federal Act was never intended as a shield
to the production required by Amendment 7 and other provisions of
Florida law, and Amendment 7 and other provisions of Florida law are
not preempted by the [PSQIA]," noting that participation in a PSO is
voluntary. 27 After discussing the rights that Florida citizens have under
Amendment 7, the court explained how the Department of Health and
Human Services addressed the potential burden that providers would face
in maintaining duplicate systems to separate federally protected PSWP
from the information required by the state.1 2 8 The reference to removing
information from the PSES when it is required under a state reporting
requirement recognizes that the information in the PSES remains
protected, while the information that is removed and externally reported
does not remain protected.1 2 9
The court focused on two exceptions to the definition of PSWP,13 0
specifically, the exception that provides that a patient's original
documentation including his or her medical record is not PSWP, and that
PSWP does not include information that exists separately from a PSES,
noting that separate information does not become PSWP simply by
reporting it to a PSO.13 1 Further, the Court also gave weight to the section
of the PSQIA stating that the PSQIA it should not be construed "to limit,
alter, or affect the requirements of Federal, State, or local law pertaining
to information that is not privileged or confidential under [the
PSQIA]."l3 2 Interpreting the PSQIA in this way blatantly diverges from
Congress's intent. The information sought in this case did not fall into
either of the two exceptions identified by the court and therefore, the
PSQIA was not limiting any State law pertaining to information that is
not privileged and confidential under the PSQIA.

127. Charles v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 209 So. 3d 1199, 1203 (Fla. 2017).
128. Id. at 1204-05 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. X, § 25(a), (c)(3)) ("Patients [have] 'a right to
have access to any records made or received in the course of business by a health care facility or
provider relating to any adverse medical incident.' . . . 'Adverse medical incident' is defined
broadly to include 'any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health care provider
that caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient .
). See also 42 C.F.R.

§ 3.20(2)(ii) (2017).
129.
(Fla. 1st
130.
131.
132.

Brief of Amici Curiae at 9, S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., v. Charles, 178 So. 3d 102
DCA 2015) (No. 1115-0109).
42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(i)-(ii) (2012).
Charles 11, 209 So. 3d at 1210-11.
Id See also 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(g)(2) (2012).
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The Court pointed to Florida Statute § 395.0197(4)-(7) (2015) and
Florida Administration Code Rule 59A-10.005.1 3 3 Together, these laws
require a risk management program that includes incident reporting and
the establishment of a risk management system to report adverse
incidents to the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration.1 3 4 The
Court criticized the First District Court of Appeal's interpretation of the
PSQIA, claiming that the lower court did not consider the statute as a
whole, and pointed to a separate exception of PSWP, specifically, that
information that exists separately from a PSES is not PSWP.13 5 The Court
explained that adverse medical incident reports are not PSWP and,
therefore, are not confidential, because Florida law requires the creation
and maintenance of the reports and Amendment 7 provides for patient
access to the state-required reports.136 The Court ultimately concluded
that the reports at issue in the case fell within the exception to the PSQIA
finding that the information existed separately from a PSES. 1 37
When evaluating whether information falls under the definition of
PSWP, if information developed by a provider in a PSES for reporting to
a PSO, the information would, therefore, meet the definition of PSWP.
This exception was included in the PSQIA to disable providers from
placing information into the PSES after the fact to resist and avoid
discovery.' 3 8 The interpretation used by the Court "equates records
'collected, maintained, or developed separately,' with records 'not
for the purpose of submission to a patient safety evaluation
created solely
1 39
system."'
The text of the exception does not mention a "sole purpose"
requirement, "nor does it mention state law." 40 The exception refers to
where the information was stored, either inside the PSES or outside of
the PSES.141 The Court's interpretation of the PSQIA transformed the
inquiry from determining how the documents were maintained and
transformed it into an inquiry of whether the documents are subject to
state reporting requirements. 4 2 The definition of PSWP does not mention
a sole purpose or state reporting requirements. 14 3 The test set forth by
Congress begins by identifying if the documents are the type eligible for
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
1446).
139.

Charles II, 209 So. 3d at 1211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Charles II, 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017) (No. 16Id. (citations omitted).

140. Id. at 16.
141. Id.
142.
143.

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 16.
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the privilege, and if so, identifying if the provider created and maintained
them in a PSES for reporting to a PSO.1
The "sole purpose" test contradicts the PSQIA.14 5 The final rule issued
by HHS "does not limit the purpose for which patient safety work product
may be shared internal to an entity."1 46 Further, the PSQIA includes a
number of exceptions in which PSWP may be disclosed; however, the
PSWP does not lose its status as PSWP and remains confidential and
privileged. 147 These exceptions show that Congress contemplated "the
use of [PSWP] for more than one purpose."1 4 8
The Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute defeats the
purpose of the PSQIA, namely creating a federal privilege to protect
information sharing. 14 9 The PSQIA "preempts 'any other provision of
Federal, State, or local law' that might require the disclosure of such
information." 5 0 If this exception to the definition of PSWP is interpreted
to exclude any information that exists in any part because of a state
requirement, it would defeat Congress's purpose.' 5 ' This exception
merely functions to keep separate information from becoming privileged
simply because a provider opts to report it to a PSO. 15 2
Further, "treating certain state-regulated records as privilegedis fully
consistent with Congress's respect for state regulation of 'information
that is not privileged"' 53 Any violation of state law can and should be
handled in the same way as it was before the PSQIA was enacted.
The Court also disagreed with the lower court's ruling regarding
preemption.1 54 Because the Florida Supreme Court decided that the
documents at issue did meet the definition of PSWP, the Court stated that
"the [PSQIA] does not contain any express statement of preemption
relating to Amendment 7."s155 If the Court found that the documents at
issue did meet the definition of PSWP, the documents would have
144. Id. at 17.
145. Id. at 18.
146. Id.; Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732, 70,737 (Nov. 2008).
147. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Charles II, 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017) (No. 161446); H.R. REP. No. 109-197, at 14 (2005).
148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 18, Charles II, 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017) (No. 161446).
149.

See id. at 19.

150. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a) (2012).
151. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Charles II, 209 So. 3d 1199 (Fla. 2017) (No. 161446).
152. Id. at 19. See also 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii) (2012).
153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Charles II, 209 So. 3d 1199 (2017) (No. 16-1446).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(g)(2) (stating that the PSQIA should not be construed "to limit,
alter, or affect the requirements of. . . State ... law pertaining to information that is not privileged
or confidential under [the PSQIA].").
154. Charles v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 209 So. 3d 1199, 1213 (Fla. 2017).
155. Id.
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qualified under the preemption clause cited by the lower court. 1 5 6 The
Court went on to explain that, in its view, the PSQIA's voluntary
participation in conjunction with a provider's choice to place documents
into a PSES does not lend itself to preemption of a "mandatory disclosure
The Court ended the preemption
law in our state constitution."'
discussion by pointing to, and disagreeing with, two specific premises
that the First District found.15 8 The Court disagreed that the primary
purpose of medical malpractice actions is punitive in nature, and instead
concluded that the main purpose is to compensate the victim of medical
malpractice. 1 5 9 Further, the court disagreed that compliance with both the
PSQIA and Florida law would be impossible, and stated that "medical
malpractice actions can and should coexist with the [PSQIA]."l6 0
Although the primary purpose of medical malpractice actions, in
theory, is to compensate the victim of medical malpractice, the reality of
the results in Florida show that medical malpractice actions are punitive
in nature. Medical malpractice actions may compensate the victim in the
short term, but in the long term, medical malpractice actions hurt both the
victim, because they will become a patient again in the future, as well as
all other future patients. If doctors cannot learn from their mistakes and
are met with punitive measures, such as Amendment 7, that showcase
errors in medical malpractice actions, the terrible cycle will not end.
Without information sharing, increasing and ensuring patient safety is
essentially unattainable. The PSQIA provided Florida the tools and
opportunity to proactively prevent medical errors, but instead, the Court
chose to punish providers, and in turn, patients.
CONCLUSION

"To err is human, but errors can be prevented."l 6 1 This is no longer
the case for Florida given the current precedent surrounding the PSQIA.
The battle of the ballots got the best of the Florida voters. By voting yes
on Amendment 7, the voters inadvertently provided a litigation tool
disguised as a new right for citizens. Providers and hospitals in the state
of Florida, that may have decided to join the patient safety revolution no
longer have an incentive to participate. It is likely that Florida will spiral
back into a state of crisis due to the effects of medical malpractice jury
awards and medical liability premiums. Without a new Florida
Constitutional Amendment or explicit new language added to the PSQIA
by Congress, stating that the PSQIA preempts Florida's Amendment 7,
156. See 42 U.S.C.
157.
158.

§ 299b-22(a).

Charles II, 209 So. 3d at 1214.
Id. at 1216.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161.

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 5, at 5.
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the future of patient safety and quality improvement in Florida is
ominous.

62

162. However, during the publication of this article, one federal court
questioned the PSQIA's preemption of Amendment 7. In that case, an Amendment 7
request resulted in 241 potentially responsive documents that are protected as PSWP
under the PSQIA, because they were created in a PSES for submitting to their PSO and
were reported to the PSO. The trial court ordered production of the documents, and the
Defendant pursued action against the Secretary of the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, seeking to enjoin the Secretary from enforcing penalties
under the PSQIA for improper disclosure of the documents under the trial court order.
The court stated that 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a)(1)-(2) is an express preemption clause that
demonstrates Congress's intent to supersede any court order requiring production of
documents that meet the definition of PSWP. The court added that the court was not
persuaded by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Charles on the issue of
preemption because the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the documents at issue in
Charleswere not PSWP, and therefore, the issue of preemption was not directly at issue.
This ruling has the potential to bring back the needed protections provided by the
PSQIA. Although, it seems that the ruling may indicate the protections exist only if the
information in the PSES has actually been reported to a PSO at the time of the
Amendment 7 request, which seems to disregard 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A)(i)(II),
leaving the true impact of this ruling unknown. See Order in Fla. Health Sciences Ctr.,
Inc. d/b/a Tampa Gen. Hosp. v. Alex Azar, Sec' of U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Case No. 8:18-cv-238-T-30CPT, at 9-10 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2019).
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